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Abstract—With the increasing complexity of Cyber-Physical
Systems, their behavior and decisions become increasingly
difficult to understand and comprehend for users and other
stakeholders. Our vision is to build self-explainable systems
that can, at run-time, answer questions about the system’s past,
current, and future behavior. As hitherto no design methodology
or reference framework exists for building such systems,
we propose the Monitor, Analyze, Build, Explain (MAB-EX)
framework for building self-explainable systems that leverage
requirements- and explainability models at run-time. The basic
idea of MAB-EX is to first Monitor and Analyze a certain behavior
of a system, then Build an explanation from explanation models
and convey this EXplanation in a suitable way to a stakeholder.
We also take into account that new explanations can be learned,
by updating the explanation models, should new and yet un-
explainable behavior be detected by the system.
Index Terms—Explainability, self-adaptive systems, cyber-
physical systems
I. MOTIVATION
The complexity of Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is con-
stantly increasing because they control more and more complex
processes in the physical world, possibly with multiple users,
changing contexts, and changing environmental conditions.
Hence, their software is distributed, concurrent, and combines
discrete and continuous aspects. Due to this complexity,
it becomes increasingly difficult for system- and software
engineers, but also users, auditors, and other stakeholders,
to comprehend the behavior of a system. Thus, it will be
increasingly relevant for future CPS to explain their behavior
to their stakeholders. This is essential to improve the trust and
understanding between the user and the system [1], to enhance
collaboration, and to increase confidence [2]. Our vision is to
enable the development of self-explainable systems that can –
at run-time – answer questions about their past, current, and
future behavior, e.g., why a certain action was taken, what
goals the system tries to achieve and how, etc.
An example for an ambiguous action that might need
explanation could be that a user in an autonomous car wishes
to know an answer to the following question: “Why are we
leaving the highway?”. Here, the observed behavior is “leaving
the highway”. However, there could be several explanations
for the behavior, e.g., “We are leaving the highway ...”
• “... because there is a traffic jam ahead”; or
• “... because we reached our travel destination”; or
• “... because we need to drive to a gas station”.
Adding such self-explainability capabilities, however, is
difficult. Self-explainability requires that the system has some
understanding (i.e., a model) of itself, its environment, the
requirements that it shall satisfy, and more: an understanding
of the stakeholder that requires an explanation, and mechanisms
that can reflect on the current behavior and provide hindsight
and foresight. To date, there is no requirements engineering
or design methodology for building such systems, and there is
no reference framework for building self-explainable systems.
In this paper, we propose such a reference framework for
building self-explainable systems which bases on the Monitor,
Analyze, Plan, Execute (MAPE) loop for self-adaptive systems
from IBM [3]. The MAPE loop proposes to continuously
monitor relevant system and environment data, and, based on
this, analyze whether an adaptation is necessary to satisfy
system goals/ improve the performance. According to the
analysis results, the system plans and executes a suitable
adaptation. As we need similar self-reflection capabilities for
a self-explaining system, we adapt this feedback loop to our
needs. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach by
sketching realizations in an example use case of a Vehicle-to-
X (V2X) driver assistance system, which is prototypical for
cooperative mobile systems in smart cities [4].
We introduce details on our Monitor, Analyze, Build, Explain
(MAB-EX) framework and how it adapts the MAPE loop in
Section III. Afterwards, we illustrate its application to our
use case in Section IV. We discuss challenges yet to face and
potential extensions of our framework in Section V. For related
work on explainability of CPS see the following Section II.
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II. EXPLAINABILITY IN SOFTWARE-INTENSIVE CPS –
AN OVERVIEW
Explainability has gained attention due to research projects
on Explainable AI. Whereas these projects focus on explaining
machine learning results, many CPS make context-dependent
decisions that are not based on ML. To explain these decisions,
some approaches focus on explainable planning: In [5],
Assumption-based Argumentation is used to model planning
problems and to generate explanations for planning solutions as
well as for invalid plans. [6] explicitly focus on CPS. This work-
in-progress aims at providing interactive explanations based
on Why and Why-Not questions from end-users about specific
behaviors of the system. Answers are provided in form of
contrastive explanations. Explanations contain the consequences
or properties of choices, and how the choices affect goals and
objectives of the system. In [7], verbal explanations of multi-
objective probabilistic planning are automatically generated.
They also use contrastive justification as explanation for why
a generated behavior is preferred to other alternatives. In
contrast to our work, these approaches focus on how to generate
explanations and do neither provide a framework for identifying
situations that need to be explained nor provide automatic
customization to users and operation contexts.
In [8], the authors sketch first steps towards a conceptual
framework for self-explaining CPS. Similar to our approach,
they propose to add a layer for self-explanation that includes
an abstract model of the system, and they propose to adjust
the granularity of explanations for different user groups. In
contrast to our work, they propose to construct cause-effect
chains for observable actions using the abstract model. Users
can access these chains to understand the cause of actions.
In [9], a feedback loop approach is used to identify situations
where it is valuable to ask a user for feedback about system
behavior. There, the authors compare the user behavior with a
goal model and ask for feedback when users achieve sub-goals
or when they deviate from an expected sub-goal. This is similar
to our detection of situations that might need an explanation.
Other work has focused on rationalizing and verbalizing
the behavior of autonomous agents. Rationalizations do not
need to accurately reflect the true decision-making process,
but give some explanations like humans would give in similar
situations. In [10] an agent’s actions are rationalized by using
an encoder-decoder neural network to translate between state-
action information and natural language. In [11] the agent’s
experiences on a route are verbalized by converting sensor data
into natural language as answer to user queries with varying
levels of abstraction, specificity and locality. Another approach
to generate explanations at run-time is to use a multi-modal
agent that can be queried ‘on-demand’ [12], [13]. There, the
system behaviors are mapped into a modified version of fault
trees, which the authors call model of autonomy, that capture
the possible states of the system [14]. The authors found that
the explanations given by the agent helped improving the
fidelity of the operators’ mental model, increasing the operator’s
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Fig. 1. The Monitor, Analyze, Build, Explain (MAB-EX) framework.
understanding of what the autonomous vehicles were doing
and why, as well as how they work [13].
III. THE MAB-EX LOOP FOR EXPLAINABILITY
Our framework for self-explaining systems is inspired by
the MAPE loop for self-adaptive systems, as we need similar
self-reflection capabilities to detect the possible need for an
explanation and to provide context-specific explanations. To
achieve this, we propose the Monitor, Analyze, Build, Explain
(MAB-EX) framework as depicted in Figure 1. Note that the
underlying system does not need to be self-adaptive. Our
MAB-EX loop can be added to any kind of computing system.
However, if the underlying system is self-adaptive, our approach
can also be integrated into the existing (MAPE) feedback loop.
Similar to the MAPE loop, we first Monitor the control system,
its environment and possibly also the recipient of explanations.
To this end, we capture and sample relevant sensor data, (a
history of) commands from controller components, and possibly
also a history of user and/or system interactions and former
explanations. To identify whether the user is satisfied with an
explanation, we could also monitor the users face expressions
(cf. [15]).
Then, we Analyze the monitored data to detect an explanation
need. This need can either be triggered because a recipient
requires it (e.g., “Why are we leaving the highway?”) or
because the system shows behavior that requires an explanation
(e.g., “We are slowing down soon, because the road ahead is in
poor condition.”). The latter can be detected by identifying de-
viations from formerly observed behavior that might indicate an
explanation need. Examples are irregularities in the monitored
sensor data or sudden changes in the way the user interacts
with the system. In the former case we additionally need to
analyze whether the change can be expected, e.g., due to a user
interaction. Furthermore, the history of controller commands or
user commands can be analyzed to identify aimless sequences
of commands/ interactions (e.g., contradicting commands over
time that lead to nowhere). In case of explanation queries from
the recipient, the query can be processed in this phase.
Instead of planning new behavior like in the MAPE loop, our
third phase is to Build an explanation by evaluating an internal
model of the system, which we call explanation model, based
on the currently monitored system behavior, in order to extract
relevant information. An explanation model is a behavioral
model of the system that captures causal relationships between
events and system reactions. It allows for identifying possible
causes for the behavior that needs to be explained, e.g., traces
of events that may lead to the behavior. It may also allow
for look-ahead simulation to enable answering questions like
“What happens if ... ?” or “When will ... be possible again?”.
Possible implementations for an explanation model could, e.g.,
be (fault/decision) trees that connect observations to possible
reasons, or executable behavior models (e.g., state machines),
as illustrated in our case study in Section IV. Such models may
be constructed from requirements or from a behavior model,
constructed manually, or learned from observations. Possible
implementations also could be goal models that capture goals,
objectives and motivations for the systems’ behavior. Note
that this synthesized explanation is not yet in a recipient-
understandable format, but in an intermediate format. With
recipient we refer to the addressee of an explanation, which
can be a user (e.g., engineer or end-user) or a (sub-)system.
Thus, the fourth and last phase is to actually EXplain the
behavior in question to the recipient, meaning to transfer the
result of the building phase to an understandable explanation
for the target group. The explanation should be target-specific,
as, e.g., an engineer might need more detailed information than
an end-user, and an end-user might not understand technical
terms that are useful for the engineer. To this end, we use a
recipient model, e.g., mental model of a human recipient or
an explanation interface between control software of different
systems (e.g., to allow for collaborative learning and operation).
It describes preferences of the recipient w.r.t. explanation format
(e.g., textual, image, voice, or machine-processable) and kind
of information that should be included in an explanation (e.g.,
level of abstraction, points of interest). These recipient models
can range from general mental models for target groups (e.g.,
engineers vs. end-users) to models for individual users.
The final explanation is provided to the recipient and thus,
we do not have a loop anymore. However, we might have an
indirect loop by monitoring the recipient’s reaction to the given
explanation or because the recipient itself asks for more details
on the explanation.
As both, the system that needs to be explained and the
recipient of the explanation may evolve over time or are subject
to uncertainties at design time (about the system behavior, its
operational context, and the recipient and its preferences),
we include a Model Learning into our framework that is
responsible for updating both our explanation model and our
recipient model. Consider, e.g., the case that an emergency
maneuver is executed due to a spontaneously changing extreme
weather condition for autonomous driving. If the monitored and
analyzed behavior is not contained in the explanation model,
an explanation cannot be built immediately in the building
phase. However, after having integrated this new behavior
into the explanation model, an explanation can be provided
later or if the behavior should occur again. Model Learning
can be realized using machine learning algorithms, or as an
expert system, where domain experts (and probably also other
cooperating systems) are asked to provide an explanation for the
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Fig. 2. Vehicle-to-X (V2X) narrow passage coordination assistance system
observed situation, or as combination of both. This cooperative
updating process could, e.g., be realized by connecting Model
Learning components of different systems and experts via a
cloud service. To update the recipient model, preferences of the
recipient can be inferred from the interaction with the recipient
(e.g., based on follow-up questions that indicate the wish for
further information).
IV. EXAMPLE REALIZATIONS OF MAB-EX
We illustrate the MAB-EX framework by instantiating it
for an example of an advanced V2X driver assistance system
such as is typically envisioned for future cooperative mobile
systems [4]. This system helps drivers safely pass obstacles on
the road (see Figure 2). In this example, cars that approach the
obstacle register at an obstacle controller and await permission
to enter the narrow street section. The system’s response (pass
or stop) is displayed to the driver. We focus on a car (c1 in
Figure 2) that must stop and where the driver wonders why
passing the obstacle is not possible—even though the roadworks
is on the opposite lane and the road ahead seems free. We
envision that an interface (top left of Figure 2) provides an
explanation to this question. The explanation in this case is
twofold: There is a car in the narrow street section approaching
from the other side (which the driver may not see yet), and,
moreover, there is an emergency vehicle approaching from
the other side, which is not yet in the narrow section, but has
registered at the obstacle controller as a priority vehicle. Other
reasons to stop could be fairness to cars that already waited
for a long time.
We illustrate the four building blocks of the framework for
this example.
A. Monitor
As stated in Section III, we monitor the controlled system
to identify situations that demand an explanation. In the
example, we need information about the position of a car
in the lane (L1 or L2) and the controller’s response towards
the event of approaching the obstacle (enteringDisallowed or
enteringAllowed). Since we are only interested in one specific
Fig. 3. Model of causality for the car example. Each node has a condition
of system variables and a natural language explanation. A model of causality
may contain as many nodes and depth levels as necessary.
situation in this example, we do not need more information.
In extended scenarios, it may be interesting to monitor, for
example, the vehicle’s speed to identify critical situations that
may demand an explanation. If the system has a query feature
for explanations in its HMI, we need to monitor user queries
as well.
B. Analyze
We analyze the monitored data and identify situations that
need to be explained. In our example, the only situation that
needs an explanation is when a car is approaching the obstacle
on lane L1 and the controller responds with enteringDisallowed.
C. Build
Building the actual explanation is usually the greatest
challenge in the MAB-EX framework. We present two solutions
that can be used to identify and compose the ingredients of
an explanation (i.e., the causes of the event that needs to be
explained). The first solution to provide such explanations
is based on models of causality, which connect actions
of the system to their (possibly internal) causes, including
natural language descriptions. The second solution shows how
behavioral models of the system that are created at design-time
can be leveraged to assemble explanations at run-time.
1) Models of Causality Approach: This approach was
explored before for providing explanations to operators of
autonomous underwater vehicles [14], [13]. We can also apply
this approach to the example above.
Figure 3 shows a tree for the situation of when a car stops
in our case example. The root node is the observable event
(“Vehicle Stops”) and the branches give the possible reasons
for the event. Traversing down the tree gives the explanations,
which are attached to the nodes as natural language sentences.
The explanations are increasingly detailed further down the
tree, allowing to easily adapt to the user’s needs. Together with
the explanations, the nodes have a condition in terms of system
variables that can be checked to determine if the node could
be a plausible reason for the observable event.
A solution based on models of causality gives a high-level
representation of the events without looking at the system
details. Thus, the trees are independent from the system imple-
mentation, which allows to build these trees at any point of the
system’s life. They can be directly derived at the requirement
specification phase or built after the system has been released.
This approach requires minimal or no changes to the system that
it explains, as they only monitor system variables to evaluate
the node conditions. The level of abstraction over the system’s
internal processes makes controlling the amount of information
disclosed easily adjustable.
However, the models of causality rely on manual modeling,
which involves system knowledge that only those building or
maintaining the system itself can provide. They also require
knowing ahead of time which events can happen and the
different explanations for the phenomena. Thus, they are limited
(or focused) to explaining certain predefined state conditions.
2) Creating Explanations Dynamically from Run-Time Mod-
els: The above approach has the advantage that designers can
easily model the system’s explanation capabilities, specifically
control the level of abstraction of the explanations, and
that it can be easily integrated into a system: However, the
explanations are limited to the phenomena anticipated at design
time, and they are limited to explanations concerning specific
(current or past) states—properties of sequences of states or
predictions about the future are not possible. To achieve this, we
require more elaborate models at run-time, which connect the
behavior of the system and its environment with requirements
specification, assumption specifications, and which can be
queried and, especially, executed for look-ahead predictions.
Such an approach could be based on executable scenario-
based behavior models, e.g., Live Sequence Charts (LSC) [16],
that can be annotated with per-requirement/scenario rationales,
or could contain trace links to natural language requirements,
from which explanations can then be derived dynamically, at
run-time. The executable scenarios could live solely within the
system’s explanation layer (as EX models), but they can even
be used as the final implementation code for the distributed
reactive behavior of CPS such as our example V2X system [17].
We sketch a scenario-based explanation approach in the
following. Listing 1 shows scenarios from the example V2X
system in Scenario Modeling Language (SML) [18], a textual
language for modeling LSC-style scenarios. An SML specifi-
cation models, via assumption- and guarantee scenarios, how
objects of a system and its environment interact by sending
messages. Guarantee scenarios describe how the developed
(software) system may, must, or must not react to environment
events; assumption scenarios (not shown here) describe what
may, will, or will not happen in the environment. Each scenario
models valid sequences of events, using different modalities.
1 ...
2 guarantee scenario CarRegistersAtObstacle
3 bindings [oc = cp.obstacleCtrl] {
4 sensor -> car.approachingObstacle()
5 //@EX: when approaching an obstacle, the car must register at
the obstacle control
6 strict requested car -> oc.register()
7 }
8
9 guarantee scenario CarEnteringAllowedDefault {
10 car -> oc.register()
11 // @EX: entering is allowed because there is no indication to
disallow it.
12 requested oc -> car.enteringAllowed()
13 } constraints [
14 interrupt oc -> car.enteringDisallowed()
15 ]
16
17 guarantee scenario CarEnteringDisallowedWhenCarPassing {
18 car -> oc.register()
19 alternative [car.direction == L1 && !oc.passingL2.isEmpty() ||
car.direction == L2 && !oc.passingL1.isEmpty()] {
20 // @EX: entering is disallowed because other cars are passing
the obstacle in the opposite direction.
21 strict requested oc -> car.enteringDisallowed()
22 } constraints [
23 forbidden oc -> car.enteringAllowed()
24 ]
25 }
26
27 guarantee scenario EnteringDisallowedForOtherPriorityVehicle {
28 car -> oc.register()
29 alternative [!oc.registeredPriorityVehicles.isEmpty()
30 && !oc.registeredPriorityVehicles.contains(car)]{
31 // @EX: entering is disallowed because a priority vehicle is
registered for passing the obstacle.
32 strict requested oc -> car.enteringDisallowed()
33 } constraints [
34 forbidden oc -> car.enteringAllowed()
35 ]
36
37 guarantee scenario SetPriorityForEmergencyVehicle {
38 car -> oc.register()
39 alternative [car instanceOf EmergencyVehicle] {
40 // @EX: car registered is a priority vehicle because it is an
emergency vehicle.
41 strict committed oc -> oc.registeredPriorityVehicles.add(car)
42 }
43 }
44 }
45 ...
Listing 1. SML scenarios for the V2X driver assistance system
For example, events can be requested, which means that the
event must eventually occur; non-requested messages need
never occur. Events can also be strict, saying that when the
scenario is waiting for the event to occur, no event must occur
that is expected within the same scenario at an earlier or
later point. The forbidden modality models events that are
forbidden while (a certain part of) a scenario is active; interrupt
models events that are allowed, but will interrupt the scenario.
The scenarios are executable; at execution-time, multiple
scenarios can be active at the same time, each requesting
or forbidding certain events, and events are chosen to satisfy
all the constraints imposed by the scenarios.
The scenario CarRegistersAtObstacle specifies that when
a car sensor detects that the car approaches an obstacle, the
car must register at the obstacle controller oc. The scenario
CarEnteringAllowedDefault specifies that the obstacle control
shall allow the car to enter, unless the scenario is interrupted by
the enteringDisallowed event that can be requested, for example,
by the scenario CarEnteringDisallowedWhenCarPassing, which
models the case of a car that is passing the obstacle in the
other direction. Scenario EnteringDisallowedForOtherPriority-
Vehicle models the case where a priority vehicle is registered
[1] CarRegisters
    AtObstacle
[1] CarEntering- 
    AllowedDefault
[1] CarEntering- 
    DisallowedWhen- 
    CarPassing
[1] EnteringDis- 
    allowedFor- 
    OtherPriority- 
    Vehicle
......
env->c1.
approaching-
Obstacle
c1->oc.
register
oc->c1.
entering-
Disallowed
Fig. 4. Scenario run-time states for the V2X example
for passing the obstacle while the car that is subject to that
scenario is itself not a priority vehicle. Last, SetPriorityFor-
EmergencyVehicle specifies that when an emergency vehicle
registers at the obstacle control, it will be added to the list of
registeredPriorityVehicles (cf. Figure 2).
Figure 4 shows a sequence of states in the execution
of these scenarios. For brevity we omit the states of the
underlying objects. Starting with the approachingObstacle event
the scenario CarRegistersAtObstacle is activated. Then, register
terminates CarRegistersAtObstacle, but activates CarEntering-
AllowedDefault, CarEnteringDisallowedWhenCarPassing, and
EnteringDisallowedForOtherPriorityVehicle. In this case, enter-
ingDisallowed is executed due to the conditions in the latter
two scenarios that are satisfied in the state as in Figure 2.
The scenarios contain explanations annotated to all events
that they request. This way, an explanation as show in Figure 2
can be produced by combining these explanations. Figure 2
also shows that the explanation component is able to answer
the follow-up question Why is a priority vehicle registered?.
This question can be answered by traversing over the past
states in search of the events that contributed to rendering the
condition true. In this example, a past activation of SetPriority-
ForEmergencyVehicle triggered by the register message from
the emergency vehicle c3 caused the event of adding c3 to
the list of registeredPriorityVehicles, which was the point from
when the evaluation of the condition in EnteringDisallowedFor-
OtherPriorityVehicle turned from false to true.
The scenarios could also be used for a forward-exploration
of possible future behaviors that could be used to answer
questions about the future, such as When will I be allowed
to pass the obstacle? Moreover, instead of annotating the
scenarios with explanations, these could also be extracted from
textual requirements that could be referenced via trace links. It
will be interesting to elaborate how also explanations for not
executing certain events can be provided.
D. Explain
Finally, we need to generate the actual explanation from the
information gathered in the Build component. In our example,
the explanation is given as a text that is generated from the text
fragments associated with the nodes in the model of causality
or with the annotations in the scenario specifications. This way,
the provided explanation for the detected situation is rendered
as “Entering is disallowed because other cars are passing
the obstacle in the opposite direction and a priority vehicle is
registered for passing the obstacle“.
V. CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH ROADMAP
The MAB-EX approach towards explainability of system
run-time behavior represents a first approach towards a general-
izable architecture for self-explainable systems. We have shown
how requirements- and models-at-runtime can be exploited as
a basis for realizing self-explanation capabilities.
The road towards truly comprehensible, flexibly tailored
explanations yields many challenges:
Comprehensible explanations: Useful explanations demand
for a representation of decisions that supports tailoring the
abstraction of explanation parts to the recipient, e.g., in contrast
to the infamous Windows operating system blue screens
’explaining’ its failure in terms of memory locations. Similarly,
in engineering CPS with domain experts, a networking engineer
might be very interested in communication decisions, but less
in HCI decisions the system has made.
Explanation presentation: Depending on the facts to be
explained or the receivers’ background, different presentations
of explanations will be of different usefulness. While engineers
might prefer textual explanations (e.g., log files), users might
prefer graphical explanations or conversational interfaces.
Focused explanations: To prevent systems from overwhelming
receivers with potentially relevant information we need to con-
ceive means for filtering and truncating explanation information
based on, e.g., user studies or learned patterns.
Consultable explainers: When systems are capable of pro-
ducing a wealth of explanations of different extent, abstraction,
and personalization, being able to consult systems for specific
explanations becomes necessary to support producing the best-
possible explanations for different circumstances.
Interactive explanations: Similar to human discourse, self-
explaining systems may produce explanations that entail
subsequent queries about the reasons for a given explanation.
Consequently, truly useful self-explaining systems should
support interactive exploration of explanations, explanation
sequences, and metadata (e.g., relations between explanations).
Explanation prediction: Systems equipped with means for
self-explanation should be able to explain the future potential
behavior as well as why expected events did not happen. This
could have the form of explicit what-if queries or online
explanation about expected behavior.
Cooperative explanations: To understand the behavior of
systems cooperating in the Internet of Things, the smart factory
of the future, or in V2X, systems must be able cooperatively
explain their behavior. This demands for means to align their
explanation terminologies (e.g., through explanation ontologies
for specific domains) and might require reason about their own
behavior based on implicit explanations (i.e., observations) of
the cooperating systems’ behaviors.
A posteriori explaining: The long-lived systems in industrial
domains will need to cooperate with systems incapable of
explaining themselves. Therefore, means to explain system
behavior based on observations made by a posteriori deployed,
dedicated explainers is necessary.
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